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Summary 
Although there are different aircraft manufacturers and hence different practical solutions, 
there is one bottom line in automation. In aviation automation is only complement to humans. It is 
not present to challenge the pilot's role and responsibility. The use of new technologies and im-
plementation of new functionality are dictated only by: significant safety benefits, obvious opera-
tional advantages, and clear response to the pilot's needs and operational factors influencing his 
functioning. The paper will discuss different approaches to automation related to flight operations 
in aviation. The paper intends to demonstrate how different manufacturers’ approaches follows 
quite similar ideas in different automated system designs. The paper does not intend to give any fi-
nal say when choosing one concept or the other. That is the matter of different circumstances re-
quiring more justifying space and different criteria than the pure scientific one. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Act of piloting an aircraft involves an advanced 
animal working in an unnatural environment. Hu-
man natural sensors are either lacking or inappro-
priate. One could reasonably state that: ”...humans 
have no natural flying ability. the means by which 
human fly is by harnessing nature via science and 
technology to bring the unnatural art of flying into 
the sphere of knowledge and sensibility with which 
we have the capability to deal.” [4] 
From the early days of aviation flying an air-
plane was often hard physical work. The larger and 
faster aircraft became, the more human strength 
was required to control them. In the early 1980s 
secondary flight control design (flaps and trimmers) 
began to utilize electrical signals from the control 
lever via computers to the hydraulic actuators of the 
surfaces. 
The designer constantly searched for better per-
formance, flying in all weathers and efficiently. Pi-
lots needed extra sensors to compensate for the loss 
of some of their original cues. What was wanted 
and what was needed often got confused as it is al-
ways in the beginning. The number of sensors and 
systems fitted to the aircraft increased and were 
added in an ad hoc fashion. Some systems operated 
in ways conflicted in principle of operation with 
other systems fitted. In its early days automation of 
tasks grew in an uncoordinated fashion. 
Generally speaking automation is “...the alloca-
tion of function to machines that would otherwise 
be allocated to humans”.[10] Flight Deck Automa-
tion specifically consists of machines which per-
form functions otherwise performed by pilots. The 
hierarchy between the automation and the human is 
crucial. Automation should have a wide range of 
functional capabilities. Precise in the execution of 
its tasks just like copilot it should pay close atten-
tion to the captain's desires.[3] 
New technology has always introduced chal-
lenges and potential operational difficulties. They 
lead to the emergence of new science dealing with 
human factors related to the interaction of pilots 
and advanced system in cockpit. [10] Human fac-
tors in engineering and ergonomics evolved to deal 
with problems thrown up during advances in auto-
mation.[4] Metallurgy, fiber optics, computer 
hardware and software have contributed to in-
creased safety and efficiency of modern automated 
aircraft as well. 
As shown in Figure 1. Human Engineering in-
volves the relationship between humans, proce-
dures, machines and environment. System and as-
sociated equipment must be designed to promote 
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work in the environment with proper procedures, 
work patterns and personnel safety and health. Dis-
comfort, distraction, or any other factor that de-
grades human performance or increases error is of 
major concern and must be minimized. [1] 
 
Automated Flight Control Systems (AFCS) lim-
its flight envelope for pilot to use all of aircraft per-
formance safely. [7] Boeing B777 and Airbus  
A320 are just some amongst today’s aircraft that re-
ly on AFCS full time. 
2. PAST 
Since 1910 aircraft systems have been progres-
sively more automated (introduction of gyroscopic 
stabilizer, coupled navigation on the Douglas DC6, 
Flight Management System on the Boeing B767). 
[10] 
Each new generation of aircraft has resulted in 
safer and more efficient flight. Much of original 
technology aviation owes to other industries. It was 
not that these were necessarily the most suitable 
technologies - they were the only means to achieve 
what was desired at that time. 
The first aircraft performance computer was 
probably the analog performance computer pro-
posed in late 1950s for the CONVAIR 990. This 
computer incorporated a simple flight planning op-
tion. The potential of Area Navigation to replace 
airway navigation was recognized as a means of 
operating shorter direct routes and reducing con-
gestion in the late 1960s. One of the very few dedi-
cated area navigation systems was Collins system 
specified by KLM, SAS, and Swissair for the 
DC10-30. 
Following the oil crisis in 1973 the need to con-
serve fuel triggered several proposals for Perfor-
mance Computer System ( PCS ). In the late 1970 
proposals for flight management systems ((FMS) 
were put forward integrating Area Navigation, au-
topilot, PCS, and other functions. [2] 
In the early days there were no dials in the 
cockpits. Many instruments were displaying only 
one information at a time(parameter) independent-
ly. 
Mid 50's brought increased number of aircraft 
operating in more demanding traffic conditions. 
Since then cockpits hardly changed to early 80’s. 
The additional info has been added in the form of 
new additional instruments. Conventional "dial" 
cockpits have usually offered the juxtaposition of 
many dials. With the time some limited amount of 
information has been integrated or synthesized. 
Early 80's brought Cathode Ray Tubes. Their 
introduction opened two ways ahead 
(a) copying the old dials or 
(b) rearranging amount of data required by 
crew in order to properly concentrate the 
information provided by the aircraft sys-
tems and to take benefit of new computers. 
[9] 
In the early 80's aeronautical world was flying 
through some kind of typhoon: 
 there were deregulation, democratization of air 
travel, fast increase in the number of passen-
ger, greater and greater cargo transport de-
mand, 
 the public expectations for flight safety became 
immense . The flight efficiency requirements 
from the operators were continuously growing, 
 the technological steps forward in digital com-
puters, display units etc. were accelerating. 
This was precisely the period when Airbus Indus-
trie decided to launch the A320 having in mind to 
subsequently launch the A330/ 340, in other word 
to give birth to and aircraft family. [13] 
Airbus Industrie cockpits show the way automa-
tion has developed: 
 A300B2/B4 (3 men classic cockpit, early 
seventies), 
 A300-600 (2 men digital cockpit, early 
eighties), 
 A320 (2 men automated cockpit, mid eight-
ies). [5] 
3. AUTOMATION DESIGN AND 
APPLICATION TODAY 
When PCS/ FMS were firstly introduced pilots’ 
acceptance was sometimes a problem. This could 
be avoided by more attention to human factors in 
the system design and by proper training today and 
in future. 
Ergonomic guidelines in today’s aviation regu-
lation regarding control systems, equipment and 
airworthiness are very comprehensive. [5] 
Each of turbine airframe manufacturers – for 
business aviation or airline - take great pride in its 
proprietary approach to automation and considers 
its human factors engineering to be part of its com-
petitive positioning. 
 
Humans Machine
s 
Procedure
s 
Figure 1. Human factors relationship 
between humans, procedures, machines 
and environment [1] 
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Considering automation in aircraft of today 
there are two main question:  
 What to automate ? 
Pilots as workers have their strengths and 
weaknesses. They are best as decision makers 
for strategic functions while automation is bet-
ter for tactical tasks: consistent accurate and 
safe operation, fast computations, and repeti-
tive tasks. 
 Why to automate? 
Automation is there to improve the safety for 
the sake of all; improve the comfort the sake of 
passenger; improve the efficiency the sake of 
operator and air traffic system. [5] 
The fail safe design concepts hinges on the need 
to perform failure analysis. The best approach to 
this is to consider human strengths and weaknesses 
and thus give the pilot the role for which he is best 
suited. [5] 
Automatic Flight Control Systems reliability re-
quired is: 
If aircraft flies 3000 hours a year that is proba-
bility of one failure in every 300 years. This proba-
bility is based on the possibility of death of healthy 
person within next hour. With life expectance of 75 
years probability of such an event is approximately:  
Rounded to 1/ 10e-7 means that the flight can 
be completed even if one of pilot dies in flight. [7] 
It is act of supreme arrogance for a software en-
gineer to imagine that he or she can imagine all the 
ways in which it might be necessary to fly the air-
craft. Pilots should develop a confidence that they 
have the management skills to use automation - in 
real life something new will always happen.  
Some present automation systems may be con-
sidered willful to the point of mutiny. To avoid that 
manufacturers employ pre production debugging by 
Computer Aided Design (CAD) programs during 
design. Airline personnel (e.g. airline customers, 
test and flight crew training pilots, airline customer 
pilots), interest groups (regulatory agencies , the 
flight training industry U. S. national aeronautics 
and space admin. (NASA), suppliers and research 
organizations) and various sources (e.g. accident/ 
incident reports) give inputs to manufacturers.[10] 
Boeing applied that procedures in two recent 
major steps: developing of Boeing B777 Electronic 
Check List [8] and flight deck. For the Boeing 777 
customers’ needs were used to determine 'what' new 
features and functions were required and the flight 
deck design philosophy to determine 'how' these 
new features and functions would be implemented. 
[12] 
Manufactures and users agree on the guidelines 
that must be followed when designing automated 
systems for aircraft of today. No matter whether 
they are called Boeing Flight Deck Philosophy [8] 
or Airbus Ten Design High Level Rules [5], they 
are very close to the user’s needs. 
The pilot is final authority for the operation of 
the airplane and is ultimately responsible for the 
safe operation of the aircraft. Pilot's tasks in order 
of priority are safety, passenger comfort, and effi-
ciency. Automation inputs should be consistent in a 
given piece of equipment and automation should 
not produce effects which are unwanted, illogical 
and inconsistent with safe practice. It should always 
defer to humans and should never be programmed 
to actively counteract them.[3] The aircraft essen-
tial systems have to provide full authority to the pi-
lot in order to achieve the maximum possible per-
formance with a simple intuitive procedure. New 
products must be designed in order to make greater, 
not less use of the humans in the cockpit.[6] 
Both crewmembers are ultimately responsible 
for the safe conduct of flight. The overall cockpit 
design should favor the inter-pilot communication. 
Hence first failures are dealt with automatically in 
order to contain the workload for two man crew to 
an acceptable level. [4] 
The design of a new cockpit accommodates for 
a wide range of pilot skill levels and experience ac-
quired on earlier aircraft and during past training. 
Automatic flight should follow logically from man-
ual flight (Keep It Simple Stupid (KISS) seems a 
good guide).[4] The question of what is controlling 
the aircraft should be clear. Therefore modes and 
mode changes must have a consistent philosophy. 
The aircraft should react in a manner which is con-
sistent with the annunciation. 
The automation is considered as a complement 
to the pilot. Pilot's main tasks have always been: 
operate, navigate, and communicate (manage in to-
day’s cockpits).[9] Automation should not come in 
place of pilot skills. Automation must be designed 
to enhance the decision making abilities of the crew 
not replace them. It can perform many predictable 
tasks with a tireless precision. It lacks the ability to 
produce flexible response to unexpected changes in 
circumstances present on almost every flight.[3] 
The system design process includes human fac-
tors considerations to minimize the potential of pi-
lot errors. Switch operating philosophy should be 
described. It must be fault tolerant with no irre-
versible actions without crew attention. Transient 
faults should be self corrected, particularly those 
caused by software design deficiencies. Failure 
modes should be progressive e.g. alternate automat-
ic control with gradual degradation of operation 
and finally either failure or restricted get-me-home 
1
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type function. First failures must be annunciated. 
Unannounced failures that can lead to a dramatic 
change in capability are not at all desirable even if 
it upsets operators and manufacturers' dispatch reli-
ability figures when the information is provided. [4] 
The cockpit design aims at simplifying the pilot 
tasks by enhancing system awareness. It is true that 
automation lacks overall situational awareness that 
is critical for the safety of flight and efficiency of 
flight operations. Therefore, the crew should be 
clearly informed of the current capability of the air-
craft. Pilot intervention, if required, should be min-
imal and at a suitable intellectual level and support-
ed by suitable information that can be readily as-
similated, i. e. graphics with values or ranges, not 
masses of digits. As full automation could lead to a 
loss of crew awareness of the primary cause of fail-
ure warning systems should be integrated with sys-
tems display. [4] 
The human machine interface are optimized 
considering the pilot's strengths and weaknesses. 
The answer to many problems with present automa-
tion might be fuzzy logic that gives the highest pri-
ority to latest pilot’s requests. Pilot should be able 
to exert control without being forced to disconnect 
the automation except in the most extraordinary 
circumstances. [3] Proper annunciation of mode 
changes (sound) must be ensured. It is important as 
well that automated systems have adequate displays 
to keep the operator informed about what is going 
on, and what is programmed to happen next. 
Automation design should address fundamental 
human strengths, limitations and individual differ-
ences-for both normal and non normal operations 
designing them to be selected on for all normal 
flight, except for manual landings. Placing more at-
tention to making transitions pilot friendly would 
help to increase the probability of pilots electing to 
go manual sooner and more frequently. [3] 
4. FUTURE 
At one time fabric and string biplanes were 
looked upon in awe. In the course of one human 
lifetime, aircraft design has evolved to level far re-
moved from those humble beginnings. The use of 
data systems on aircraft and in the wider air naviga-
tion system is still in infancy. 
Fly By Wire Airbus aircraft have already been 
in airline service for more than seven years and 
over 700 are currently in service (operated by 10 
000 pilots from over 60 operators worldwide). That 
fleet has logged over seven million flight hours in 
over four million flight cycles.[11] 
We are at a point no unlike that in engineering 
in the year 1910. Yet the development of data pro-
cessing, data links, displays, and interface devices 
is accelerating at a pace far exceeding that of early 
aviation . It is important to maintain a vision for the 
future, and not to be too much in awe of current ap-
plications.  What is in service today is no longer 
state of the art. Before the first prototype of new 
design flies, its computer systems are already obso-
lete. [3] 
Today's rapidly advancing technology can pro-
vide an infinite number of new products, but each 
has its price. An affordable product of value to the 
customer is of prime importance. Technology mere-
ly enables us to provide new features. [12] 
Retrofitting of pilot windows with interactive 
data overlays (that will be more efficient to use in 
traffic dense airspace [6]) or evolution in display 
and the way pilots put together their perception of 
the situation in flight [9] are just some of the things 
coming in future. 
All manufacturers and user groups agree in one 
fundamental fact: “Evolution of flight deck is 
properly controlled only if a clear cockpit philoso-
phy is defined.“ [5] 
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